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INTRODUCTION 
Over one hundred years ago, Lassa Oppenheim asked, “[I]s the 
Law of Nations ripe for codification?” and answered with a qualified 
yes.1  Oppenheim recognized disadvantages that would come with cod-
ification:  “[i]nterfere[nce] with the so-called organic growth of the 
law through usage into custom,” subsequent interpretation that fo-
cused more on the letter than the spirit of the law, and the risk that 
the codifiers would make “clumsy” choices and do “more harm than 
good.”2  But for him, the likely improvements in clarity, substance, and 
uniformity that codification offered outweighed these costs.  Oppen-
heim went on to urge a project whereby a “generation of able jurists” 
could “prepare draft codes for those parts of International Law which 
may be considered ripe for codification.”3  He expressed the hope  
that some “noble-minded monarch of far-reaching influence”  
would initiate the project.4 
 
†
 Sharswood Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  My thanks to the edi-
tors of PENNumbra and to Meg deGuzman and David Zaring for helpful comments. 
1 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW:  A TREATISE 42 (1905). 
2 Id. at 39-40.   
3 Id. at 43. 
4 Id. 
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In a terrific new article, Professor Timothy Meyer challenges this 
exalted view of codification, which numerous scholars since Oppen-
heim have echoed.5  Meyer argues in Codifying Custom that codification 
is a self-interested project undertaken by rational and perhaps even 
cunning states seeking to write the rules in their own favor.6  He does 
not dismiss the possibility that codification projects clarify or progres-
sively develop international law, but he views this possibility, which he 
terms the Clarification Thesis, as overstated.7  He argues that another 
common motive for codification is what he calls the Capture Thesis:  
“states often use codification to capture customary international legal 
rules to benefit themselves at the expense of the general welfare . . . .”8 
Codifying Custom provides an important reminder that codification 
is not divorced from the individual and often competing interests of 
the states involved.  More specifically, Professor Meyer makes a valua-
ble and original contribution in arguing that these competing interests 
may influence decisions concerning both whether to codify and in 
what forum to do so.  Few would doubt that particularized state inter-
ests matter enormously once a codification of customary international 
law is underway—a skim through the travaux preparatoires of any codify-
ing treaty demonstrates this point—but the role these interests play in 
shaping decisions whether to codify has been undertheorized.  Most pow-
erfully, Professor Meyer suggests that competing state interests can lead 
to what might be called competitive codifications:  situations in which 
different groups of states engage in separate, contrasting codifications 
rather than approving a single, shared approach.9 
In this Response, I consider the strength of Professor Meyer’s Cap-
ture Thesis and discuss some implications of his findings.  Professor 
Meyer makes a persuasive case that states might pursue codification to 
advance understandings of customary international law that will ad-
vantage them at the expense of other states.10  But I have difficulty with 
 
5 See Timothy L. Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1000 n.15 (2012) 
(citing various sources).  
6 Id. at 998. 
7 Id. at 1000. 
8 Id. at 998; see also id. at 1001.  Professor Meyer also notes that states may seek codi-
fication in order to improve compliance, as where a treaty both codifies customary 
international law and includes monitoring or enforcement provisions (the “Compli-
ance Thesis”).  Id. at 1016-17.  For the purposes of this brief Response, I will focus only 
on what Professor Meyer terms the Clarification Thesis and the Capture Thesis. 
9 Id. at 1054. 
10 Id. at 1001. 
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his further claim that such capture is in fact a common motive for cod-
ification.  My objections stem from two main sources.  First, Professor 
Meyer relies on a model that overstates the likely power of capture.  
Second, the landscape of codification today aligns more with the Clari-
fication Thesis than with the Capture Thesis.  Thus, I think the Cap-
ture Thesis is much less powerful than Professor Meyer suggests.  Since 
I accept that capture could sometimes drive codification, however, I 
close this Response by considering how international law might re-
spond to the risk of capture.  I argue that international law already 
responds to these risks by codifying international law through mecha-
nisms that partially bypass the traditional principle of state consent. 
 
I.  DOUBTS ABOUT THE REACH OF THE CAPTURE THESIS 
 
A.  The Model 
 
Professor Meyer supports the Capture Thesis largely by reasoning 
deductively from a model that treats states as unitary, self-interested, 
rational actors and that views these states as the relevant international 
actors in the codification process.  The simplifying features of this 
model are ones that are likely to magnify the importance of capture 
and downplay that of clarification. 
Perhaps most obviously, this model ignores nonstate actors.  In his 
descriptive account of codification, Professor Meyer acknowledges the 
role played in codification by nonstate actors such as the International 
Law Commission (ILC),11 but he does not factor the influence of these 
actors into his model.  In actuality, their presence strengthens the 
Clarification Thesis and weakens the Capture Thesis in multiple re-
spects.  By downplaying the Clarification Thesis, for example, Profes-
sor Meyer emphasizes the transaction costs of negotiations;12 however, 
nonstate actors like the ILC reduce some of these costs and transform 
others into fixed costs associated with codification in general.  States 
fund much of the ILC’s costs through their contributions to the Unit-
ed Nations budget,13 but they do not make individual choices about 
 
11 Id. at 1005-06. 
12 Id. at 1037. 
13 See Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2010–2011, pt. III, § 8, para. 
18, U.N. Doc. A/64/6 (Mar. 19, 2009) (budgeting more than two million dollars for 
the ILC from 2010–2011).  The ILC may also receive indirect subsidies from private 
entities, such as academic institutions that are home to ILC members.  Another exam-
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which projects their money supports and thus do not earmark their 
funds in ways that would further capture.  The ILC’s role also mitigates 
the holdout problem Professor Meyer identifies regarding the Clarifi-
cation Thesis.14  Because the ILC’s codifications do not bind states di-
rectly, but rather serve as presumptive embodiments of customary 
international law, the ILC does not need every state to agree in order 
to produce a codification.  
Professor Meyer’s assumption that states are unitary, rational actors 
similarly undervalues clarification and overvalues capture.  For exam-
ple, the incentives of diplomats who decide whether to pursue codifi-
cation do not align perfectly with disembodied state interests.  Rather 
than viewing treaty negotiations as transaction costs that reduce the 
appeal of clarification, diplomats may view these negotiations as the 
best and most exciting part of their jobs (and be more sympathetic to 
overall welfare maximization than pure state interest would suggest15).  
More fundamentally, there is the broader question of how much states 
actually resemble classical rational actors.  If states are motivated by 
behavioral pressures such as acculturation16 beyond what a rational 
choice model would predict, then they will be significantly more in-
clined toward clarification than Professor Meyer’s model suggests. 
 
B.  The Landscape 
 
My sense that clarification has played a bigger role than capture in 
motivating codifications is reinforced by the present landscape of in-
ternational law.  Professor Meyer does not cite to any codifiers who 
acknowledge capture as a motivation—as compared to numerous ones 
who emphasize clarification—so we must look for indirect evidence to 
 
ple of private funding, the influential Harvard Research in International Law, was financed 
in part by John D. Rockefeller, Jr.  See John P. Grant & J. Craig Barker, 1 THE HARVARD 
RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  ORIGINAL MATERIALS 3 (2008). 
14 See Meyer, supra note 5, at 1014-15. 
15 U.S. negotiators who participated in the drafting of the Rome Statute, for exam-
ple, were more sympathetic to the International Criminal Court than were other key 
U.S. actors.  See, e.g., William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal 
Court:  It’s All About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 701, 708-09 (2004) (observing 
that U.S. negotiators could have “wreck[ed] the [negotiating] process” but instead 
showed sincere interest in furthering the treaty). 
16 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States:  Socialization and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626-27 (2004) (describing the impact of 
international law on state behavior through acculturation, the “general process by 
which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture”). 
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support the Capture Thesis.17  Yet the present landscape of international 
law does not bear a close resemblance to what Professor Meyer’s model 
would lead us to expect. 
Professor Meyer rests his intuition of capture most prominently on 
the claim that, groups of like-minded states, by codifying interpreta-
tions of custom that they themselves favor, can thereby influence other 
states to accept these interpretations.18  Yet in practice we do not see 
these kinds of consciously competing codifications of custom nearly as 
often as this argument might suggest.  Professor Meyer points to one 
interesting modern example—the treatment of expropriations in in-
ternational investment law19—but the international community has 
undertaken numerous other codifications, including codification of 
the law of diplomatic relations, the law of the sea, and the law of trea-
ties, through processes open to participation by all states. 
Professor Meyer suggests that treaties negotiated under the auspi-
ces of worldwide organizations experience capture due to the proce-
dural rules that govern their negotiation.20  Even if true, however, it is 
hard to see how this advantage would be clear enough prior to the ne-
gotiations to serve as a powerful motivating factor in favor of codifica-
tion.  States may not understand the ground rules before entering 
 
17 I recognize that codifiers will often have strong incentives against publicly reveal-
ing that they undertook a codification for the purpose of strengthening their preferred 
version of customary international law against competing versions.  It seems unlikely, 
however, that discretion would silence all discussion of the Capture Thesis, if indeed it 
is a common motive to codification. 
Interestingly, hints of capture are perhaps most often found not in the treaty-
making process on which Professor Meyer focuses, but rather in the context of codifica-
tions by single actors with particular substantive agendas.  For example, some have 
suggested that the recent codification of customary international humanitarian law 
(IHL) by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) interprets disputed 
issues of customary international law in ways strongly favored by the ICRC.  See, e.g., 
Major J. Jeremy Marsh, Lex Lata or Lex Ferenda?  Rule 45 of the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, 198 MIL. L. REV. 116, 117-18 (2008) (arguing that the 
ICRC’s extensive study of humanitarian law “represents the ICRC’s idealistic notion of 
what states should consider customary international humanitarian law”); Leah M. 
Nicholls, Note, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates:  The International Committee of the 
Red Cross and Its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 223, 232-33 (2006) (discussing the ICRC’s methodology in codifying human-
itarian law and noting that “[s]ince the purpose of the study was a progressive one, it 
provided another strong incentive for the ICRC to push for an expansive view of  
customary IHL”). 
18 Meyer, supra note 5, at 1028. 
19 Id. at 1057-68. 
20 Id. at 1033. 
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negotiations, and thus they may not know whether they can have more 
or less influence than they do in the context of creating custom in the 
first place.  Further, if states knew the ground rules in advance, then 
the system would incentivize those states with lessened influence to 
resist codification or bargain for more equal ground rules, which can 
give rise to countervailing processes.  At the Third United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), for example, many 
states accepted exclusion from powerful working groups, but because 
consensus was the primary means of decisionmaking, they retained an 
important check on the work of these groups.21 
 
II.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE CAPTURE THESIS 
 
While I doubt that the Capture Thesis has the power Professor 
Meyer attributes to it, I think he has persuasively argued that it could 
play an occasional role in motivating codification.  What then does this 
mean for our understanding of codification?  Professor Meyer identi-
fies two potentially troubling prospects:  first, that codification can en-
trench suboptimal rules, and second, that it can lead to the 
fragmentation of international law through competing codifications.22  
His analysis is primarily descriptive, and although he does not offer 
solutions to these prospects, he does hint at two resulting implications. 
 
A.  Back to Bare Custom? 
 
First, Professor Meyer observes that “[i]n some instances, bare cus-
tomary law may be superior in delivering on the promises of a univer-
sal and decentralized legal system.”23  He does not affirmatively argue 
for a return to custom, however, and with good reason.  Even if bare 
customary law might be superior to codification, we cannot go back to 
it.  As Oppenheim observed long ago, “the fact must be recognised 
 
21 See id. at 1034-37 (discussing separately each of these two procedural tools). 
22 The first of these prospects can arise under the Clarification Thesis as well, see su-
pra text accompanying note 2, but is even more likely under the Capture Thesis.  The 
second is specific to the Capture Thesis.  For example, Professor Meyer suggests that 
the absence of an international consensus on the rule for compensating expropriation 
of foreign investment may be the result of competing codifications.  Meyer, supra note 
5, at 1057-59.  However, it is hard to decipher the causal relationships—the same deep 
underlying disagreements that led to competing codifications might also have prevent-
ed an international consensus even absent these codifications. 
23 Id. at 1069. 
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that history has given its verdict in favour of codification.”24  He rea-
soned primarily from the impulses toward clarification, but Professor 
Meyer’s arguments about capture make this point even more compel-
ling.  If individual states can gain distributional advantages through  
codifications, then under Professor Meyer’s model they will seek  
these advantages regardless of whether codification promotes  
the general welfare. 
 
B.  Away from State Consent? 
 
Second, Professor Meyer suggests that “perhaps the [requirement 
of state consent to international legal obligations] should be jettisoned 
in favor of a rule that more appropriately balances the competing ob-
jectives of international lawmakers.”25  This change would reduce the 
powers of holdout or vetoing states and thus promote overall welfare.  
Professor Meyer does not explore how this might be done in  
practice, but in the context of codifications, there are already im-
portant options available. 
One example is the use of international courts to resolve questions 
of customary international law.  For example, faced with competing 
state interpretations of the law governing treaty reservations in the 
years following World War II, the General Assembly requested and 
received an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) on the issue.26  Although the decisions of international courts 
are not codifications per se and do not have binding effect beyond the 
parties in a contentious case,27 they can nonetheless resolve disputes 
about customary international law in ways that become generally ac-
cepted.  The ICJ’s decision on treaty reservations framed the issue go-
ing forward and was ultimately incorporated into the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.28  A second way to avoid the con-
sent requirement is to use soft-law codifications that are not binding 
 
24 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 40.   
25 Meyer, supra note 5, at 1069. 
26 Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Geno-
cide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28). 
27 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945,  
59 Stat. 1055. 
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331; see also Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307, 312-14 (2006) 
(describing how the ICJ’s approach to treaty reservations shaped  the method used in 
the Vienna Convention). 
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treaties but that nonetheless command worldwide respect.  The ILC’s 
development of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility is a fairly re-
cent example of this kind of codification.29 
While these kinds of delegations do not eliminate the possibility of 
suboptimal rules, they do reduce holdout problems, promote uni-
formity, make use of expertise, and leave open at least some  
possibility for subsequent revision.  They thus amount to already-
existing and reasonable, though not perfect, real-world solutions to 
the problem of capture.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The codification of custom is likely to be with us for as long as any 
custom remains.  Codifying Custom offers a novel and interesting twist 
on why such codifications occur.  While Professor Meyer’s emphasis on 
capture may be overstated, he has provided a valuable counterpoint to 
traditional understandings of the purposes behind codification. 
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29 Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, at 
43-58, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001); see also Draft Arti-
cles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, at 1-
2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) (welcoming the conclusion of the Draft 
Articles and commending them to states’ attention). 
